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et al.: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
N.Y. CoNST. art. 1, § 6.
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be

allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions ....

U.S. CONST. amend VT:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the
Assistance of Counselfor his defence.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIED DEPARTIENT

People v. Benson
(decided Jan. 20, 1994)

Defendant claimed that his lawyer's failure to raise the issue of
his statutory right to a speedy trial amounted to a denial of the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed under the State2 and
Federal 3 Constitutions. 4 The court remitted the matter to further
develop the record and held defendant's motion to vacate in
abeyance.

5

1. 200 A.D.2d 861, 606 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1994).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states, in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel... ." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This provision states, in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial... and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id. See
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (stating that the right to counsel
includes the effective assistance of counsel).
4. Benson, 200 A.D.2d at 862, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
5. Id. at 863, 606 N.Y.S.2d. at 829.
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Defendant pled guilty to three criminal counts arising from
three separate indictments. The first indictment charged
defendant with burglary and petit larceny. 6 In the second action,
defendant was charged with criminal mischief. In the third
action, the defendant was charged with second degree criminal
possession of a forged instrument. 7 The second and third actions
exceeded the statutory six month commencement required by
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 30.30(1)(a). 8
Although the court noted that counsel for defendant
acknowledged receiving a timely notice of readiness for the
second action, the record was unclear in regard to the date of the
action for the charge of possession of a forged instrument. 9 The
record listed November 25, 1991 as the date a notice of readiness
was filed, one day prior to the date that the defendant was
indicted. 10
The court, citing People v. Kendzia, 11 stated that a notice of
readiness was ineffective unless the People were in fact ready to
6. Id. at 862, 606 N.Y.S.2d. at 829.
7. Id.
8. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 30.30(1)(a) (McKinney 1993). The section
provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion
made... must be granted where the people are not ready for trial
within: (a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action
wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of
which is a felony ....
Id.
9. Benson, 200 A.D.2d at 863, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
10. Id. at 862, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
11. 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 476 N.E.2d 287, 289, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890
(1985) ("'MIhe People must communicate readiness for trial to the court on
the record when ready to proceed.'" (quoting People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d
932, 933, 388 N.E.2d 345, 346, 415 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (1979))). In Kendzia,
convictions were overturned by the New York of Court of Appeals, because
the People were not ready for trial within the six month requirement for felony
charges as specified in § 30.30(1)(a). Id. at 338, 476 N.E.2d at 290, 486
N.Y.S.2d at 891. This occurred despite the fact that the People agreed to set a
trial date during an off the record conference and later sent a letter stating an
expectation of readiness within three weeks of the dated letter. Id. at 337-38,
476 N.E.2d at 290, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
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go to trial at the time of filing. 12 This readiness for trial requires
two elements. 1 3 First, there must be a statement of readiness that
is inserted in the trial court's record. 14 This statement can be
either a written notice delivered to both the court clerk and the
defense attorney, or a statement made by the prosecution in an
open court.1 5 Second, in order for the notice of readiness to be
valid, the statement must be made when the People are, in fact,
ready to proceed. 16 The court stated "[tihe statute contemplates
an indication of present readiness, not a prediction or expectation
17
of future readiness."
Since a void notice of readiness would result in the dismissal of
a charge, the court stated that the failure of counsel to move to
dismiss because of non-compliance with a notice of readiness
would constitute denial of the meaningful representation
guaranteed by the Federal and New York State Constitutions. 18
In People v. O'Connell,19 there was an eight month delay
between the filing of the charge and the notice of readiness. 20
The court held that unless the failure of a motion to dismiss was
attributable to trial strategy, it constituted a denial of effective
21
representation.
The federal courts addressed the lack of a motion to dismiss in
Barkerv. Wingo,22 where the Supreme Court denied a claim for
a violation of the right to a speedy trial because it was part of the

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Benson, 200 A.D.2d at 862, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d at 337, 476 N.E.2d at 289, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 337, 476 N.E.2d at 289-90, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
Id. at 337, 476 N.E.2d at 290, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
Benson, 200 A.D.2d at 863, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 829-30.
133 A.D.2d 970, 521 N.Y.S.2d 121 (3d Dep't 1987).
Id. at 971, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
Id.

22. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). But see United States v. Eight Thousand Eight
Hundred and Fifty Dollars in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 568 (1983)
(holding that 18 months was not unreasonable delay in filing judicial forfeiture
action).
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defendant's trial strategy. 23 An accomplice who was being tried
first had a strong chance of acquittal, and Mr. Barker did not
object to the delay of his own trial while the accomplice was
tried. 24 The Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the lack of a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of violation of a speedy trial
because of incompetent counsel can be a situation warranting
dismissal on appeal. 25
The failure to raise an issue, which would result in dismissal of
the charges, is thus ineffective assistance of counsel in the federal
courts as well as in New York State courts, and is violative of
both constitutions. However, if the failure to raise the issue is
part of a defendant's trial strategy, there is no valid claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in either state or federal court.
SUPREME COURT
RICHMOND COUNTY

People v. Costello 26
(printed September 15, 1994)
The defendants filed a motion to set aside their convictions27
pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law section
330.30(1)28 on the ground that they were denied the effective
23. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534-36.

24. Id. at 535.
25. Id. at 536.
26. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 33-35 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County

1993).
27. The defendants were charged with five counts, in total, of which they
were convicted of three: (1) criminal trespass in the third degree under N.Y.

PENAL LAw § 140.10; (2) operating solid waste management without a permit
under N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0707(1); and (3) disposing of solid
waste at a non-permitted facility under N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6,
§ 360.15.
28. N.Y. Clm. PROC. LAW § 330.30(1) (McKinney 1993). This section
provides in pertinent part:
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